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Abstract: Online gambling allows users to participate in mental
games and bet over the Internet. It can open new opportunities for
casinos to make more money; however, at the same time, there are
a lot of security challenges. In this paper, we describe our scheme
for secure online gambling and secure mental poker protocols over
the Internet based on our previous researches. Our scheme provides
both the fairness of online gambling processes and secure linking
of the online gambling with payment. A unique link between pay-
ments and gambling outcome is provided so that the winner can
be ensured to get the payment. The gambling games are generic in
our fair online gambling scheme. Mental poker is one of most pop-
ular games of online gambling. In this paper, efficient and secure
mental poker protocols are provided. These mental poker proto-
cols are based on multiple encryption and decryption of individual
cards. These protocols satisfy all major security requirements of
a real mental poker. The card salesman has been got rid of and
the minimal effect due to collusion has been guaranteed. These
protocols are more efficient compared with other known protocols.
The strategies of players can be kept confidential with the intro-
duction of a dealer. These mental poker protocols are suitable for
implementation in an online card game.
Keywords: Online Gambling, Mental Poker Protocols, Fair Ex-
change, Applied Cryptography.
1 Introduction
The Internet has become an important marketplace for online gam-
bling. There are numerous online gambling and casino web sites on
the Internet. Growth in Internet gambling is expected all around
the globe, as the universality of the Internet combines with a world-
wide interest in gambling. The Internet paradigm could provide
a significant cross-marketing opportunity for traditional operators,
particularly to the young generation who are more familiar with
the Internet. The term online casino is broadly used to refer to
web sites that can offer its services as a casino over open networks,
such as the Internet. On many sites, customers can play against
the site operators (dealers) or against other customers. When we
consider online gambling, the bets and payoffs are the two most
important issues to be addressed. With the development of cryp-
tographic research, many practical solutions have been proposed
about gambling over the Internet [1][2][3] and how to pay money
over the Internet [4][5][6][7][8][9].
The research about different kinds of online games has a long
history, particularly regarding how to play poker in an online en-
vironment. A scheme for playing “Mental Poker” was proposed by
Shamir, Rivest and Adleman [10] in 1979. Following this, many
attempts have been made to achieve protocols that would allow
people to play “Mental Poker”. With the growth and popularity
of the Internet, on-line gambling is becoming increasingly signifi-
cant [1][11]. Mental poker is one of most popular games of online
gambling. For the purpose of on-line gambling over the Internet,
additional requirements on a poker protocol need to be consid-
ered. The need for secure and efficient protocols for card games is
becoming more and more necessary.
There have been several protocols based on public-key cryp-
tography described in literature for playing poker [12][13][14]
[15][16][17][18]. These protocols require that players generate new
key pairs for each game they play, and this could be computation-
ally intensive. Many of these protocols are not secure in their im-
plementations, and they leak partial information about the cards
themselves. There are some protocols based on multiple permu-
tations which require a trusted card salesman to be involved in
the games [1][15][19]. If card games are used for the purpose of
online gambling, the assumption of a fully trusted card salesman
is not tolerable. Some protocols [20][21][22] have no information
leakage and meet many of the important requirements of a real
poker game, but they are not practical in their implementations.
They use zero-knowledge proofs and are not efficient in shuffling
and dealing with cards.
We are interested in the situations where the online casino is
not necessarily trusted [23]. That is, we have “untrusted” gaming
sites. This is particularly important in practice as in many coun-
tries online gambling is not regulated by government authorities.
In such cases, for instance, there may not be any guarantee that
the casino authorities are not having an unfair advantage over the
players. In such circumstances, at least as far as the playing of the
game is concerned, it is necessary to have fair exchange schemes. A
fair exchange scheme [24][25][26][27] requires a trusted third party
(TTP) who helps to resolve disputes amongst the playing entities.
In general, TTP can be online or offline. For efficiency reasons,
it is preferable that TTP is offline. In this case, TTP only comes
into play when a problem occurs in the gambling system; other-
wise, TTP is not contacted. Based on our previous research [11],
we describe in this paper a general fair exchange protocol with
credit card payment and a fair online gambling scheme. The con-
tributions of our fair online gambling scheme are twofold. Firstly,
it involves the proposal of a fair exchange scheme for online gam-
bling processes. Secondly, it provides a secure linking of the online
gambling with payment. Hence the overall scheme we propose pro-
vides a unique link between a gambling process and its associated
payment, which makes the whole gambling process fair.
For the games themselves, we are interested in efficient and se-
cure online card games which can satisfy all major requirements of
a real poker protocol. Based on our previous research [28][29], we
provide mental poker protocols based on multiple encryptions and
decryptions of individual cards. These protocols have complete
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confidentiality of cards and are efficient in real implementations.
They are suitable for any number of players to play card games
for the purpose of on-line gambling. The effect of collusion is the
minimum and the strategies of players are confidential with the
introduction of a dealer.
Section 2 is about the fair online gambling scheme. Subsection
2.1 discusses the security requirements and assumptions of fair on-
line gambling. Subsection 2.2 provides the details of the proto-
col of general fair exchange with credit card payment. Subsection
2.3 describes the online gambling scheme for games from autho-
rized organizations. Subsection 2.4 describes the online gambling
scheme for pure luck games. Section 3 is about the efficient mental
poker protocol. Subsection 3.1 reviews the most popular protocols
of mental poker. Subsection 3.2 describes the cryptosystem with
multi-party encryption and decryption and discusses the commu-
tativity of multiple encryption and decryption. Subsection 3.3 pro-
vides the details of our mental poker protocols, which contain the
system initialization, card shuffling and card dealing. Subsection
3.4 discusses several important security issues of mental poker pro-
tocols and compares our mental poker protocols with well-known
protocols. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper with some final
remarks. Appendix A provides the details of equality proof of
knowledge. Appendix B provides the details of proof of equiva-
lence of discrete logarithm to discrete log-logarithm(PEDLDLL).
2 Fair Online Gambling Scheme
2.1 Security Requirements and Assump-
tions
For online gambling, physical cheating in traditional gambling en-
vironments can be easily removed. For example, players in card
gambling games can not hide cards, mark cards etc and players can
not collaborate with dealers. However, in online gambling, there
are many new kinds of security problems. Here, we list some of
the most important ones:
• hackers in open network environment
• cheating by players
• cheating by casinos
• unauthorized use of credit cards
• collusion among players and casinos
• fairness of the gaming processes
• fairness of the payments
• linkage between payments and gaming results
• privacy information collections (gambling habits and strate-
gies)
Actually, the above security issues are related to each other, and a
successful scheme as overall solution for online gambling will need
to address all of them. However, an individual scheme may empha-
size on some aspects of these requirements based on different kinds
of gambling processes. Currently, many of existing online casino
games provide some level of security and privacy. However, most
of them are entirely based on the trust of the casinos. The play-
ers have no way to check the fairness of games. Also, the fairness
of payments may not be guaranteed. The players and casinos are
adversary parties in the gambling. Hence it is undesirable to trust
the casinos by default. We are interested in the situations where
the online casinos are not trusted. This is particularly important
in practice as in many countries that online gambling is not regu-
lated by government authorities. In such cases, there may not be
any guaranty that the casino authorities are not having an unfair
advantage over the players. In such circumstances, at least as far
as the playing of the game is concerned, it is necessary to have
suitable schemes with fairness. This kind of schemes must address
both the fairness of gambling processes and payments. Gambling
processes and their associated payments must be uniquely linked
with each other.
The natures of processes and security requirements vary for dif-
ferent kinds of games in online gambling. To guarantee the fair-
ness of gaming processes, a fair online gambling scheme needs to
consider the details of the games themselves. In online gambling,
many games could come from some authorized organizations and
they could be regarded as standard gambling games. The set up
of these kinds of games should strictly follow the rules defined by
the authorized organizations. The players and dealers must both
agree with the rules of a game. Another popular kind of games are
those of chance games which are referred to as pure luck games.
The players will bet on the output of the games; actually they
are betting on lucky numbers. In our fair online gambling scheme,
we will only discuss these two kinds of generic games: one is the
games from an authorized organization and the other one is pure
luck games.
An online gambling scheme must be associated with an online
payment scheme. Credit-based payment methods [8] are quite
popular in online gambling casinos. For our online gambling
scheme, we will only consider the credit card based payment. The
fair exchange scheme we propose resolves the following disputes:
(1) the dealer refuses to make a payment to the player who has
won, (2) the dealer denies a payment that was made by a player
in advance, and (3) the player, who paid to the dealer in advance,
refuses to accept the gambling outcome after he or she has lost.
There are different kinds of online gambling in the real
world, however there are some general characteristics for all
gambling systems. We will only consider some generic processes
of online gambling. In our scheme for online gambling, we make
the following assumptions :
a) Two-way payments are involved.
— Anonymous.
— Credit Card Payment.
b) Bank is offline.
c) Trusted Third Party (TTP) is offline.
d) Cheating is prevented during whole process.
— Information must be checked.
— If there is a dispute, TTP will resolve it.
In this paper, we will discuss both games from authorised
organisations and pure luck games respectively. General fair
exchange and electronic payment are the bases of a fair online
gambling scheme. In the following section, we will give the details
of fair exchange protocol with credit card payment.
2.2 General Fair Exchange with Credit
Card Payment
Based on the research progresses of generic fair exchange protocols
[26][27, 30][31] and credit based payment for electronic commerce
[8], we propose a fair exchange protocol with credit payment us-
ing the technique of Equality Proof Knowledge (Appendix A) and
PEDLDLL (Proof of Equivalence of Discrete Logarithm to Discrete
Log-logarithm, Appendix B). Both the TTP and the bank (the
financial institution for credit authority) are offline. The credit
information of the client is anonymous. The general fair exchange
protocol with credit payment is the cornerstone of our fair online
gambling scheme.
2.2.1 Notations
Here we give the general notations which will be used in the
description of our general fair exchange protocol.
(1) Parties:
• C: Client
• M : Merchant
• TTP : Trusted Third Party
• B: Bank (Financial Institute for Credit Authority)
(2) Public Key Cryptosystems:
• PKX: Public key of user X.
• SKX: Private key of user X.
• Penc(PKX,m): Encryption of message m with public key
PKX.
• Pdec(SKX, c): Decryption of ciphertext c with private key
SKX.
(3) Digital Signature Schemes:
• pkx: Verifying key of user X.
• skx: Signing key of user X.
• < m >skx: Creation of signature of m under signing key skx.
• Sveri(pkx, < m >skx,m): Verification of signature < m >skx
on message m, true for valid and false for invalid.
(4) Other items:
• tx : Timestamp generated by party X.
• H(m): Hash function on message m.
2.2.2 System Setup
There are four parties in our protocol, and they are Client,
Merchant, TTP and Bank. Client has a pair of public and private
keys: PKC and SKC, and a pair of signing and verifying keys:
skc and pkc. Dealer has a pair of public and private keys: PKD
and SKD and a pair of signing and verifying keys: skd and pkd.
TTP has a pair of public and private keys: PKT and SKT .
We will employ the technique of proof of equivalence of discrete
logarithm to discrete log-logarithm. The above key pairs must
follow some overall rules of the whole system. This means that
these key pairs must be set up based on the same set of algorithms
and parameters. If necessary, the signature scheme of TTP, public
key cryptosystem of bank and signature scheme of bank can be
defined independently. They need not follow the same set of
algorithms and parameters.
At first, we choose three primes to set up the system. The
three primes are p, q and q′, which are of the form p = 2q +1 and
q = 2q′ + 1. We will use ElGamal cryptosystem for encryption
and decryption and a DSA-like scheme for signature.
Public Key Cryptosystems
q is the prime number for the ElGamal cryptosystem. Z∗q is a
intractable multiplicative group with order q − 1. G is a generator
of Z∗q . SKX is the private key and PKX is the public key.
PKX = GSKX mod q and SKX ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q − 2}.
The ciphertext of m under PKX is:
cx = Penc(PKX, m) = (W, V )
where W = Gw mod q and V = m(PKX)w mod q, w is
randomly chosen from {1, 2, . . . , q − 2}.
The message after decryption is:
m = V · W−SKX mod q
Digital Signature Scheme
p is the prime number for the DSA-like digital signature scheme.
Z∗p is a intractable multiplicative group with order p − 1. g is a
generator of Z∗p . skx is the signing key and pkx is the verifying
key. pkx = gskx mod p and skx ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q − 2}.
The signature of m under pkx is :
< m >skx= (r, s)
where r = gk mod p and s = k−1(h(m) + r · skx) mod q. k is
randomly chosen from {1, 2, . . . , q − 2} and h(. . .) is the hash
function.
For verification of signature, Sveri(pkx, < m >skx,m) is to
check
rs
?
= gh(m) · (pkx)r mod p
2.2.3 Construction of Important Tokens
In this section, we will give the details of digital tokens used in
our fair exchange protocol with credit card based payment.
(1) Credit Card
The token for credit card is of the form
C = < C, l, h1, h2, · · · , hl, E, A >skb
The credit token contains the client’s identity C, the confidence
level l, the expiry date E, maximum credit amount A and
hi = g
x
i mod p, where gi ∈ Z∗p are common generators for
i = 1, 2, · · · , l, where x is the concatenation of PIN number, credit
card number and salt. The credit token is signed by the bank
using its private key skb.
(2) Payment Slip
The data in the payment slip is
SlipData = C, M, O, $, tc, H(C, M, O, $, tc),
where M is ID of merchant, O is the order, $ is the amount of
money and currency type and tc is the timestamp generated by
the client C.
The payment slip token has the form
Slip =< SlipData >skc,
The payment slip is signed by the client with private key skc.
(3) Encrypted Payment Slip
The encrypted payment slip token is
CS = Penc(PKT, Slip).
The client’s payment slip is encrypted under the TTP’s public
key PKT . If necessary, TTP can open it with its private key SKT .
(4) Certificate of Encrypted Payment Slip
CSCert is the token to prove CS is a ciphertext of S without
disclosing the signature. Here, we will give all the details of
construction CS and CSCert. p and q are the two prime numbers
used in our system. The client has a pair of signing key and veri-
fying key {skc, pkc}, g is a generator of Z∗p and pkc = gskc mod p.
The TTP has public key and private key {PKT, SKT}, G is a
generator of Z∗q and PKT = GSKT mod q.
For encryption of message m, we have the following:
Penc(PKT, m) = (W, V ) mod q,
where W = Gw and V = m(PKT )w, w ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q − 2} is a
randomly chosen number.
The signature scheme works as follows: Choose a random
k ∈ Z∗q , the signature has the form
Slip =< SlipData >skc ≡ (r, s)
where r = gk mod p and s = k−1(H(m) + r × skc) mod q and
pkc = gskc mod p. Slip is the payment slip.
Encrypting the above payment slip Slip with PKT , we
have, Penc(PKT, Slip) = (W, V ). The encrypted payment slip
with signature is then given as follows:
CS = {r, W, V },
where W = Gw mod q, V = s(PKT )w mod q.
With transformation x = G, y = W−1 mod q, z = PKT ,
X = rV mod p, Y = gH(S)(pkc)r mod p and α = −w, choose
wi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q − 2}, then
t(xi) = x
wi mod q, t(Xi) = X
zwi mod p
and
c = Hl(x||y||z||X||Y ||t(x1)||t(X1)|| · · · ||t(xl)||t(Xl))
c = c1c2 · · · cl
ri = wi − ciα mod q − 1
(R, c) is the certificate CSCert for CS .
The process of verification is to check,
c = Hl((x||y||z||X||Y ||u1||U1|| · · · ||ul||Ul)
where ui = x
riyci mod q, and
Ui =
{
Xz
ri mod p if ci = 0
Y z
ri mod p if ci = 1
2.2.4 Fair Exchange Protocol
Based on the tokens defined in the last subsection, the fairness
of the exchange between a client and a merchant can be achieved
using the following fair-exchange protocol,
Fair Exchange Protocol
Merchant Client
1. <offer>skm−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2. Pencr(PKM, SlipData), CS , CSCert←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3. Pencr(PKC, <Goods>skm)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4. Pencr(PKM, Slip)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
For the above protocol, if both the client and the merchant perform
properly, the TTP will not be involved. The details of the protocol
are as the followings:
1. In step one, the merchant sends his signed offer to the client.
The offer should contain the description of the Goods and
related trading information, such as price, valid date etc. The
client checks the offer, and if the client is not satisfied with
the offer, he can quit the protocol, and therefore it is fair
for both parties.
2. In step two, the client sends the merchant his credit card
C, order information O, amount of money and currency
type $ and time stamp tc, encrypted payment slip CS and
the certificate CSCert. The encrypted payment slip CS
is encrypted with TTP’s public key. The merchant checks
the validity of the above data, and especially, the credit
information and encrypted payment slip.
(1) The merchant checks credit information with equal-
ity proof of knowledge (details are described in Appendix A.
(2) The merchant uses CSCert to check CS is the ci-
phertext of the payment slip Slip signed by the client
(details are described in section 2.2.3).
If the merchant finds anything wrong in the above
verification, he will quit the protocol, and the protocol is fair
for both parties.
3. In step three, the merchant sends Pencr(PKC, <
Goods >skm) to the client. If the Goods is consistent
with the offer, the client will continue the protocol. If the
Goods is inconsistent with the offer, the client quit the
protocol. If the merchant believes that it is not fair, he need
to require TTP to run the resolve protocol.
4. In step four, the client sends Pencr(PKM, Slip) to the mer-
chant. If the merchant can not get the payment, the merchant
will ask TTP to run resolve protocol.
The resolve protocol is normally initialized by the merchant as
followings:
Merchant TTP Client
<offer>skm, SlipData, CS , <Goods>skm−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if unfair to merchant then continue
else abort
Pencr(PKM, Slip)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Pencr(PKC,<Goods>skm)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
The above resolve protocol can guarantee the protocol to be fair
with any case. For the client, if something is wrong, he can quit
the protocol after step three and the whole protocol is fair. For
the merchant, if something is wrong after step three, he can bring
offer, SlipData, CS , Goods to TTP. TTP will check the status.
If it is really unfair to merchant, TTP will send the Goods to the
client and send the Slip to the merchant.
2.3 Games From Authorized Organiza-
tions
In this section, we assume that games are from authorized organi-
zations. The most important assumption with online casino is that
casino itself should not be trusted. Both the client and the dealer
must keep some secrets of their choice before they have given their
bets. We have developed the protocol as follows:
Protocol of Gambling from Authority
Client Dealer
1. Pencr(PKD, M0), <H(M0)>skc−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2. Pencr(PKC, M1), <H(M1)>skd←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3. Pencr(PKD, CStatus), <H(CStatus)>skc, CSC , CSCCert−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4. Pencr(PKC, DStatus), <H(DStatus)>skd, CSD, CSDCert←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5. Pencr(PKD, options), <H(options)>skc−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
6. Pencr(PKC, Gid, result), {If client wins, Pencr(PKC, CSD)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
7. Pencr(PKC, CSC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1. The client chooses a game and sends the message to the dealer
M0 = (GName, C, trc)
where GName is the name of the game to play, C is the client
ID, trc is timestamp for the message.
2. the dealer prepares the game for the client
M1 = (Game, Pencr(PKT,
< Gnmae, GID >skd), tgc)
Game is the executable program. GID is the default param-
eter for the game to run, tgc is the timestamp for the prepa-
ration of the game. For the client, GID is the secret until the
end of the game. < Gnmae, GID >skd is encrypted with
TTP’s public key PKT . If something is wrong, TTP can
decrypt it and get the GID.
3. The client runs the game, gives his option and prepares his
payment slip for betting.
(a) The client gives his option
GStatus = C, M0, M1,
Pencr(PKT, < option >skc)
For the dealer, the client’s option is secret until it is
necessary to make it public. The client’s
< option >skc is encrypted with TTP’s public key
PKT and has the signature of the client. If necessary,
TTP can open it.
(b) The client prepares payment slip
SC =< CStatus >skc
CStatus = (GStatus, CC, D, $AC, tcbc)
where CC is the credit information of the client, D is the
identification of the dealer, $AC is the quantity of money,
and tcbc is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip:
CSC = Pencr(PKT, SC).
The payment slip CSC contains the information on game sta-
tus, credit and betting. Using the techniques of PEDLDLL
discussed in the second section of this paper, CSCCert could
be constructed for checking that CSC is the encrypted pay-
ment slip.
4. The dealer prepares his payment slip based on client’s betting,
SD =< DStatus >skd
DStatus = (CStatus, CD, $AD, tdbc)
where CD: credit information of the dealer; $AD: quantity
of money; tdbc: timestamp.
Encrypted payment slip:
CSD = Pencr(PKT, SD)
The payment slip CSD contains the current information of
game status, credit and betting. Using the techniques of
PEDLDLL, CSDCert is constructed for checking that CSD
is the encrypted payment slip.
5. The client sends his option to the dealer by message
Pencr(PKD, option), < H(option) >skc
The message is encrypted with the dealer’s public key PKD.
The dealer can read the message and know client’s option.
Based on client’s options and GID, the dealer can get the
result of the game.
6. The dealer sends the client token Pencr(PKC, GID, result)
and hence, the client can get GID. At this time, the client
knows both the GID and his option, and hence he can run
the game and get the result. If the client wins, the dealer
also sends the client token Pencr(PKC, CSD). The client
gets the payment slip CSD.
7. If the dealer wins, the client sends the dealer
Pencr(PKC, CSC) and the the dealer gets payment
slip CSC).
The whole process of the gambling and payment is fair in the
above protocol. Before step 5, neither the dealer and the client
can get the result of the game. The dealer has GID as secret, the
client has options as secret. Both of them encrypt their secrets
with TTP’s public key at first. They make their secrets public
in step 5 and step 6. If the loser refuses to pay, the winner can
bring encrypted payment slip CSC and CSD to TTP. TTP can
then open them and check the result of the game. CSC contains
the information on client’s betting. CSD contains the information
on dealer’s betting. Both of them are necessary for the TTP to
check the betting process and the result. Based on checking the
result, TTP can forward SC to the dealer if the dealer wins. It
can forward SD to the client if the client wins. The whole process
is fair for both the client and the dealer.
Before the client has sent his CSC , the client has the right
to quit the protocol. Before the dealer sends his CSD, the dealer
has the right to quit the protocol. In above cases, both of them
do not have the other party’s encrypted payment slip, so they
can not get any payment or useful information of the game. The
protocol is aborted but the process is fair. If one party has the
other party’s encrypted payment slip, he can bring both CSC
and CSD to TTP. The protocol can finish with the help of TTP.
TTP can get all information of the game and betting from CSC
and CSD. TTP can get the result of the game and forward the
payment to the winner.
The above protocol can be extended in a real application.
In step 3, the client perhaps discloses part of his options for the
game to progress or prepare encrypted payment slips for betting.
In step 4, the dealer perhaps provides some information of the
current game or prepare encrypted payment slip as a response to
client’s betting. In step 5, the client makes his current options
public. Payments are given if the client chooses to trust the
dealer. This kind of processes can repeat again and again until the
end of the game or the client chooses not to trust the dealer. The
dealer sends the client GID. The client can run the game on his
local machine to check the whole process of gambling. If cheating
occurs, he can bring all encrypted payment slips to TTP to prove
that the dealer is cheating. In this case, the whole process is fair.
2.4 Pure Luck Games
Many casino games are solely games of chance [1]. This kind of
games can be abstracted to generating some random number. We
assume that there are only two parties in our pure luck game.
They will cooperate with each other to generate the random
number and they will bet on the result of the random number. In
this part, we will discuss the fairness both of game process and
the dual-payment between the two parties.
The following is the two-party protocol for generating a
random number and how they bet and arrange payment on the
output of the random number. We outline the protocol as follows:
1. Alice generates a random number and signs the hash of the
random number, Alice sends Bob the following:
M1 = H(RA), < H(RA) >ska, Pencr(PKT,
< RA >ska)
Pencr(PKT, < RA >ska) is the TTP’s public key encryp-
tion of the random number RA with the signature of Alice.
2. Bob generates a random number and signs the hash of the
random number, Bob sends Alice the following:
M2 = H(RB), < M1, H(RB) >skb,
Pencr(PKT, < RB >skb)
Pencr(PKT, < RB >skb) is the TTP’s public key encryp-
tion of the random number RB with the signature of Bob.
3. Alice prepares her encrypted payment slip and the certificate
of the encrypted payment slip
SA =< A, CA, B, M1, M2, Abetting, ta >ska
where A is Alice’s identification; CA is credit information
(defined in section 3.1) ; B is Bob identification; M1 and M2
are messages of step 1 and step 2. Abetting contains Alice’s
betting options and amount of money for this betting. ta is
timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:
CSA = Pencr(PKT, SA)
With the technique of PEDLDLL, Alice constructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slip CSACert.
Alice sends Bob
M3 = (ABetting, CSA, CSACert )
4. Bob prepares his encrypted payment slip and the certificate
of the encrypted payment slip
SB =< B, CB, A, M3, Bbetting, tb >skb
where B is Bob’s identification; CB is credit information
(defined in section 3.1) ; A is Alice’s identification; M3 is
the message of last step. Bbetting contains Bob’s response
of Alice’s betting which contains Bob’s amount of money on
this betting. tb is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:
CSB = Pencr(PKT, SB)
Using the technique of PEDLDLL, Bob constructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slip CSBCert.
Bob sends Alice
M4 = Bbetting, CSB , CSBCert
5. Alice sends Bob the actual value of number RA:
M5 = RA, < M4, RA >ska
6. Bob sends Alice the actual value of number RB :
M6 = RB , < M5, RB >skb
7. Both Alice and Bob computes the random number
R = RA XOR RB
8. If Alice loses, Alice sends Bob her payment slip SA; if Bob
loses, Bob sends Alice his payment slip SB .
In this protocol, Alice and Bob send their hashed digest at
first, then they give their betting and prepare their payment
slips. They encrypt their payment slips with TTP’s public key
and construct certificates for verifying the encrypted payment
slips. Then they send their betting, encrypted payment slips
and certificates for verifying their encrypted payment slips. In
this step, Alice and Bob have given their betting with payments
and cannot change; but they cannot get the money at this time
because payment slips are encrypted with TTP’s public key.
In steps 5 and 6, they send their actual chosen values to the
other party and then both Alice and Bob can compute the number.
The protocol is fair for both Alice and Bob. If the loser re-
fuses to pay, the winner could bring encrypted payment slips CSA
and CSB to TTP. TTP can open them and check the process of
betting. TTP can then forward the payment slip to the winner.
Alice can quit the protocol at or before step 3, Bob can quit the
protocol at or before step 4. At any other time, if one party stop
the protocol, the peer party can bring CSA and CSB to TTP, and
the protocol can continue to the end. The winner receives the
payment with the help of TTP.
3 Efficient Fair Mental Poker
Protocol
3.1 Typical Former Protocols of Mental
Poker
3.1.1 Protocol Based on Individual Card Cryp-
tosystem
Adi Shamir, Ronald Rivest, and Leonard Adleman [12] utilized
commutative cryptosystems to develop their mental poker proto-
col. Let EA and DA be Alice’s encryption and decryption func-
tions, EB and DB be Bob’s encryption and decryption functions
respectively. In real implementation, Alice and Bob agree on a
large prime number p, and respectively choose secret keys k = A
and k = B, where gcd(A, p−1) = gcd(B, p−1) = 1. Then Ek(x) ≡
xk( mod p) and Dk(x) ≡ xz( mod p), where kz ≡ 1( mod p − 1).
The above cryptosystem is a commutative cryptosystem. For all
message x, EA(DB(x)) = DB(EA(x)), EB(DA(x)) = DA(EB(x)),
EA(EB(x)) = EB(EA(x)), DA(DB(x)) = DB(DA(x)). Alice and
Bob will play the game as follows:
1. A deck of cards {1, ..., 52} is used in the cryptosystem. Alice
encrypts each card in the deck separately. Alice sends the set
{EA(1), ..., EA(52)} in a random order to Bob.
2. Bob chooses five encrypted cards at random, for example
{EA(6), EA(8), EA(17), EA(25),
EA(33)}, and sends them to Alice, Alice could know that
they are {6, 8, 17, 25, 33}.
3. Bob chooses five different encrypted cards, for example
{EA(3), EA(11), EA(19), EA(23),
EA(41)}, encrypts them, and sends them back to Alice as a
randomly ordered set {EB(EA(3)),
EB(EA(11)), EB(EA(19)), EB(EA(23)), EB(EA(41))}.
4. Alice decrypts cards one by one and sends Bob the resulting
set {EB(3), EB(11), EB(19),
EB(23), EB(41)}. Bob could decrypt and get
{3, 11, 19, 23, 41}.
5. At the end of the game, they could exchange their encryption
keys and verify that each played fairly.
Lipton [13] observed that the above implementation leaks at least
one bit of information. For a number x, if x ≡ y2(mod n) for some
y, x is a quadratic residue modulo n, otherwise, x is non-quadratic
residue. All keys must be odd numbers, and xk (mod n) is a
quadratic residue if and only if x is. If the players know which
cards are quadratic residues, and comparing them with encrypted
cards, players could have a bit of information per card. Lipton
provided some suggestions for the one bit information leak, but
there is no guarantee that the result is secure [17].
3.1.2 Protocol Based on Permutation Cryp-
tosystem
There are a series protocols [1][15][19] which are based on the mul-
tiple permutations. In the following, we will describe a popular
protocol. There are three players Alice, Bob and Charles and one
card salesman. They use the following steps to prepare a deck of
cards:
1. Card salesman chooses a permutation π
2. Alice chooses three permutations Aa, Ab and Ac. Bob chooses
three permutations Ba, Bb and Bc. Charles chooses three
permutations Ca, Cb and Cc. All the above permutations are
sent to the card salesman confidentially (only the sender and
the card salesman know them).
3. Card salesman computes and broadcasts δa =
B−1a C−1a A−1a π−1, δb = C−1b A
−1
b
B−1
b
π−1, and
δc = A
−1
c B
−1
c C
−1
c π
−1.
If a player, for example Alice, wants to draw a card, the following
protocol is used
1. Alice chooses y = π(x) which is not in any player’s hand and
broadcasts y and δa(y).
2. Bob computes and broadcasts Ba(δa(y)).
3. Charles computes and broadcasts Ca(Ba(δa(y))).
4. Alice computes x = Aa(Ca(Ba(δa(y)))).
5. All players record that y = π(x) has been in Alice’s hand.
At the end, all permutations are published to check the fairness of
the game. The above protocol could guarantee that a player can
draw a card which is not in anyone’s hand and only he could know
what the card is. If the card salesman and at least one player
plays fairly, there is no way for a player or group of colluding
players to get information of cards not in their own hands. This
protocol requires a card salesman to choose the random π and
broadcast permutations. If the card game is used for gambling,
the assumption that the card salesman be fully trusted is not a
good one. Another aspect of this this permutation based poker
scheme is that cheating can only be detected at the end of the
game and not during the protocol run.
3.2 Multi-Party Encryption and Decryp-
tion
Here we will discuss a multi-party encryption and decryption sys-
tem based on the ElGamal cryptosystem. Without losing general-
ity, we assume that there are two parties A and B. The two parties
employ a common prime number p and have the key pairs:
KA = {(p, αA, kA, βA) : βA ≡ αAkA ( mod p)}
KB = {(p, αB , kB , βB) : βB ≡ αBkB ( mod p)}
In KA, kA is the secret key and {p, αA, βA} is the public key. In
KB , kB is the secret key and {p, αB , βB} is the public key. The
multiple encryption and decryption employ ElGamal’s asymmetric
cryptosystem [32].
1. Encryption:
The original message is x. A chooses random number
rA, and the result of encryption with KA has two parts y1A
and y2A:
y1A = α
rA
A mod p
y2A = xβ
rA
A mod p
B chooses random number rB and encrypts the ciphertext
of A’s encryption (actually B encrypts y2A) and obtains the
following two parts,
y1B = α
rB
B mod p
y2AB = xβ
rA
A β
rB
B mod p
Actually, there is no difference whether A or B encrypts first;
we will get the same ciphertex y1A, y1B , y2AB .
2. Decryption:
If A uses his private key to decrypt first,
dKA (y1A, y2AB) = y2AB (y1A
kA )−1 = y2B mod p
and then B uses his private key to decrypt
dKB y2B) = y2B (y1B
kB )−1 = x mod p
x is the original message.
Actually, there is no difference whether A or B de-
crypts first; we could use the following formula to express
the whole multi-party decryption
dKA,KB ( y1A, y1B , y2AB) =
y2AB (y1A
kA )−1 (y1B kB )−1 = x mod p
The most important characteristic for the above system is the com-
mutativity of the multiple encryptions and decryptions. If a differ-
ent order is used for encryption, the final cipher-text is the same. If
a different order is used for decryption, the original message could
be obtained as well. The order of the encryptions and decryptions
will not change the result. The mental poker protocols described
in this paper are based on the power of the above commutative
cryptosystems.
3.3 Our Mental Poker Protocols
Our target is to design mental poker protocols for multiple play-
ers to play fair on-line mental poker games. The mental poker
protocols must provide fairness for the involved parties. The fair
mental poker protocols should cover both the shuffling and dealing
of the cards in a fair manner. All the involved players must be
sure that nobody has stacked the deck in the shuffling and there
is no unexpected information leak in the dealing. In mental poker
protocols presented in this paper, there is not a trusted third party
involved during the game. These protocols focus on the processes
of shuffling and dealing the cards only and is suitable for any set of
cards. Our protocols deal with cards one by one which is different
from the protocols based on permutations of cards [15]. Without
losing generality, we assume that there are two players Alice and
Bob in the card game and there is no real difference when more
players are involved.
3.3.1 Initialization
1. Alice and Bob agree to choose the same 52 tokens for 52 cards,
that are suitable encoding set {1, ... , 52}.
2. Alice and Bob agree to choose the same prime number p.
3. Alice chooses her encryption and decryption key pairs as fol-
lows:
KA = {(p, αA, kA, βA) : βA ≡ αAkA ( mod p)}
4. Alice has a public/private key pair pka and ska, ska for the
signature by Alice and pka for the verification of the Alice’s
signature by others.
5. Bob chooses his encryption and decryption key pairs as fol-
lows:
KB = {(p, αB , kB , βB) : βB ≡ αBkB ( mod p)}
6. Bob has public/private key pair pkb and skb, skb for the
signature by Bob and pkb for the verification of the Bob’s
signature by others.
3.3.2 Protocol Description
In this section, we propose two mental poker protocols based
on the cryptosystem with multiple encryptions and decryptions
described in sub section 3.2. The first protocol referred as
protocol A requires brand new encryption and decryption keys
for every game. The second protocol referred as protocol B does
not require brand new encryption and decryption keys for every
game. In protocol A, the decryption key is published at the end
of the game. In protocol B, the decryption key is secret at any
time. The encryption and decryption keys can be reused. In
both protocols, the card shuffling and dealing are based on the
encryption/decryption of individual cards.
Protocol A:
I. Card Shuffling
1. Alice chooses a set of secret random numbers {rA1, rA2,
..., rA52 } and then encrypts original card n with encryp-
tion key {p, αA, βA} and random number rAn for each card
in the card set {1, 2, ..., 52}. The set of encrypted cards is
{EA(1), ..., EA(52)} and the cards are put in the set with a
random permutation. The set of cards is sent to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a set of secret random numbers {rB1, rB2, ...,
rB52 } and then encrypts card m of the encrypted card set by
Alice with encryption key {p, αB , βB} and random number
rBm for each card in the set of cards encrypted by Alice.
The set of double encrypted cards is {EAB(1), ..., EAB(52)}
and they are put in the set with a random permutation. Bob
signs the double encrypted cards one by one and sends them
to Alice.
3. Alice signs the double encrypted cards one by one. The set
of cards is {< EAB(1) >ska,skb, ..., < EAB(52) >ska,skb}.
Alice sends them to Bob.
Now the deck of cards has been prepared. All the cards are
encrypted by Alice and Bob with their signatures.
II. Card Dealing
There are 52 cards encrypted by both Alice and Bob. At the very
beginning, the set of available order numbers is {1, ..., 52}. During
the game, if some cards are in players’ hands, the corresponding
order numbers are deleted from the available set. When a player
needs a card, the following protocol is carried out.
1. Alice needs to draw a card n, n is the card order after the
double encryptions. She sends n and < H(n) >ska to Bob.
2. Bob checks Alice’s signature and then checks that n is in the
available set or not. If it is not in the available set, Bob sends
Alice a suitable message. If it is in the available set, Bob de-
crypts the double encrypted card n. After Bob’s decryption,
it becomes EA(n). Bob sends EA(n), < m, H(EA(n)) >skb
to Alice. Bob deletes n from his available set.
3. Alice checks Bob’s signature and decrypts EA(n) to open the
card and adds the card to her hand. Alice deletes n from her
available set.
III. Fairness Verification
At the end of the game, all the involved players publish their
encryption/decryption keys and the players can verify that all
players have played fairly.
Protocol B:
I. Card Shuffling
1. Alice chooses a set of secret random numbers {rA1, rA2,
..., rA52 } and then encrypts original card n with encryp-
tion key {p, αA, βA} and random number rAn for each card
in the card set {1, 2, ..., 52}. The set of encrypted cards
is {EA(1), ..., EA(52)} and they are put in the set with
a random permutation PA. Alice signs the set of hash
of rAn {n = 1, 2, ..., 52} to get {< H(rA1) >ska, <
H(rA2) >ska, ..., < H(rA52) >ska}. Alice signs the hash of
PA. Alice sends {EA(1), ..., EA(52)}, < H(PA) >ska and
{< H(rA1) >ska, < H(rA2) >ska, ..., < H(rA52) >ska} to
Bob.
2. Bob chooses a set of secret random numbers {rB1, rB2, ...,
rB52 } and then encrypts card m of the encrypted card set
by Alice with encryption key {p, αB , βB} and random num-
ber rBm for each card in the set of cards encrypted by Alice.
The set of double encrypted cards is {EAB(1), ..., EAB(52)}
and they are put in the set with a random permutation PB.
Bob signs the set of hash of rBm {m = 1, 2, ..., 52} to
get {< H(rB1) >ska, < H(rB2) >ska, ..., < H(rB52) >ska
}. Bob signs the double encrypted cards one by one and
signs the hash of PB. Bob sends {< EAB(1) >skb, ..., <
EAB(52) >skb}, < H(PB) >skb and {< H(rB1) >skb, <
H(rB2) >skb, ..., < H(rB52) >skb} to Alice.
3. Alice put her signature on each card in {< EAB(1) >skb
, ..., < EAB(52) >skb}. The set of cards becomes {<
EAB(1) >ska,skb, ..., < EAB(52) >ska,skb}. Alice sends the
doubled signed cards to Bob.
Now the deck of cards has been prepared. All the cards are
encrypted by Alice and Bob with their signatures.
II. Card Dealing
The card dealing of protocol B is exactly the same as the
card dealing in protocol A. All details of card dealing have been
provided in protocol A and we will not repeat it again here.
III. Fairness Verification
At the end of the game, all the involved players publish their
random permutations and set of random numbers that they have
used in the encryptions of cards in the card shuffling. The players
can use the encryption keys and the random numbers used in the
encryptions to check that all players have played fairly or not.
3.4 Discussion of Our Mental Poker Pro-
tocols
Here we discuss some important security properties of mental
poker protocols described in this paper. We compared our
protocols with previously published protocols.
(I) Confidentiality of Cards
In order to design mental poker based on encryptions and
decryptions of individual cards, Shamir et al designed a mental
poker protocol based on RSA cryptosystem [10][12]. Shamir et al
mental poker is efficient but there is at least one bit information
leak [13][17]. To avoid the information leak, Zhao et al [28]
proposed an efficient TTP-free mental poker based on ElGamal
cryptosystem. Unfortunately, a security flaw is introduced [33].
The mental poker protocols provided in this paper are based on
our previous research [29], the security flaw has been removed and
the complete confidentiality of cards has been achieved. Actually,
the mentioned security flaw comes from the reusing of the same
random number in the encryptions of the whole set of cards.
When different random numbers are used in the encryptions of
the set of cards, the mentioned security flaw is removed.
(II) Without card salesman
There is a card salesman involved in previous protocols [1][15][19]
that are based on multiple permutations. The fairness of this kind
of protocols is based on the assumption that the card salesman is
fully trusted. In real gambling, such an assumption is definitely
not a good one. We can not assume the existence of such a
fully trusted party in online gambling. The mental poker proto-
cols presented in this paper get rid of the card salesman completely.
(III) Any Number of Players
Based on the commutativity of multi encryptions and decryptions,
it is convenient to expand the protocols to multi-players. With
the same prime number p, every player, for example X, has key
pair KX = {(p, αX , aX , βX) : βX ≡ αXaX ( mod p)}. In the card
shuffling process, every player X chooses a set of secret random
numbers {rX1, rX2, ..., rX52 }. All cards are multi-encrypted by
all players. In the card dealing, when player X draws a card, all
other players decrypt the card, and only player X can open the
card. All players delete the card from the available set.
(IV) Security Against Player Collusions
The presented mental poker protocols can guarantee the minimal
effect of collusion. Even if two players collude, they can only
obtain each other’s cards but not a card of a third player. Because
every card is multi-encrypted by all the players, a card is opened
only in the case that all players have decrypted it. Any subset of
players can not know anything about the cards of other players.
No collusion among cheating players can affect the cards drawn
by an honest player and untouched cards.
(V) Complete Confidentiality of Strategy
The protocols presented in this paper asks players to reveal all
information at the end of the game. It makes it impossible for the
players to bluff. Real poker players would never accept to play
such a game. Fortunately, if a dealer is involved, it is very easy to
modify the above protocols. When shuffling cards, every player
X chooses his secret random number set {rX1, rX2, ..., rX52 }
and sends {< H(rX1) >, < H(rX2) >, ..., < H(rX52) > } to
the dealer. During the game, every player sends the information
of his actions (for retrieving in the future, except opened cards)
to the dealer. At the end of the game, every player sends his
secret random number set to the dealer. The dealer is able to
check the fairness of the whole game. During the game, the card
information is confidential to the dealer. The dealer is the only
person who can know the strategy of each player at the end of
the game. Such an assumption is reasonable and acceptable. It is
much better than the assumption of a card salesman who is fully
trusted and knows all card information during the game.
(VI) Efficiency and Clarity
The cryptosystem used in this paper is based on the popular
ElGamal cryptosystem. For a game of two players, there are only
104 times ElGamal encryptions and decryptions. For a game
of n players, there are 52 × n ElGamal encryptions and 52 × n
ElGamal decryptions. The protocol is very efficient. For a group
of players, after the system has been setup, they can use their
encryption/decryption key pairs and public/private key pairs for
multiple games. For a new game, the players only need to choose
new secret random numbers (encryption parameters). There
are several other successful protocols based on zero-knowledge
proofs. Unfortunately they are not practical and are often very
complicated and messy. They need a fairly long computation time
to shuffle a deck of cards.
4 Conclusions
In the fair online gambling scheme, we have presented protocols for
games from authority organization and pure luck games which are
useful in implementing some real online games. The protocols can
guarantee the fairness of both the games and payments. The major
feature of these protocols lies in the use of encrypted payment slips
and certificates of the encrypted payment slips.
The presented mental poker protocols have achieved the ma-
jor requirements of a complete poker system. The protocols are
secure, efficient and suitable for any number of players. The pre-
sented mental poker protocols get rid of the card salesman entity
completely and there is minimal effect due to collusion of players.
With the introduction of a dealer, the strategies of players can be
made confidential to other people (except the dealer). In this case,
the dealer only becomes aware of the strategies of players at the
end of the game.
For online gambling, there are a fairly large number of card
games. The gambling requires actions such as placing bets and
dealing with payments. The presented mental poker protocols are
based on individual cards. It is easy to combine this kind of proto-
cols with the management protocols of whole gambling processes.
Based on the fair online gambling scheme and fair mental poker
protocols, the fairness required to use card games in online gam-
bling can be achieved.
Our fair online gambling scheme is only suitable for some online
games. There are many other open problems related to the fairness
of online gambling games; for example, if there are more than two
people involved in a game, how to deal with the issue of collusion?
The fair mental poker protocols have some open problems as well,
such as how to return a card to the deck. There are still many open
issues in designing fair, secure and efficient protocols for different
kinds of online games for the purpose of gambling.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Equality Proof of Knowledge
The scheme of equality proof of knowledge was initially proposed
by Chaum and Pedersen [34] and Verheul and Tilborg [35]. The
scheme is about proving knowledge of something without revealing
anything about its content. The public information includes a
prime number p and a generator gi ∈ Z∗p , i = 1, 2, · · · , l, where
l is the confidence level. In order to prove x, the prover chooses
r ∈ Z∗p and computes
ai = g
r
i mod p,
hi = g
x
i mod p.
Challenges c and z are calculated as follows
c = H(g1||g2|| · · · ||gl||a1||a2|| · · · ||al||h1||h2|| · · · ||hl),
z = cx + r mod p.
The verifier will check the following equation to prove the knowl-
edge
gzi
?
= hci ai mod p.
For all i, gzi = h
c
i ai mod p indicates that the prover has the
knowledge; otherwise, he does not.
Appendix B: Proof of Equivalence of
Discrete Logarithm to Discrete Log-
logarithm(PEDLDLL)
PEDLDLL was initially proposed by Stadler [36]. For two given
primes p and q (where p = 2q + 1), let x, y, z ∈ Z∗q and X, Y ∈ Z∗p .
There exists an α ∈ {1, 2, · · · q − 2} such that y = xα mod q and
Y = Xz
α
mod p. Without revealing α and zα, a prover, who
knows α, can generate a certificate to prove that y = xα mod q
and Y = Xz
α
mod p.
If the confidence level is l, for i = 1, 2, · · · , l, the prover chooses
wi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q − 2} and computes t(xi) = xwi mod q, t(Xi) =
Xz
wi mod p. Then he could get
c = Hl(x||y||z||X||Y ||t(x1)||t(X1)|| · · · ||t(xl)||t(Xl)).
For every bit c = c1c2 · · · cl, the prover computes R =
(r1, r2, · · · , rl), where ri = wi − ciα mod q − 1. The certificate
is given by (R, c).
During certificate verification, the verifier will check whether
c = Hl(x||y||z||X||Y ||u1||U1|| · · · ||ul||Ul)
where ui = x
riyci mod q and
Ui =
{
Xz
ri mod p if ci = 0
Y z
ri mod p if ci = 1
